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that God is morally blameworthy for causing evil. In this sense, Excusing
Sinners and Blaming God is a defensive book. What reasons are there for
thinking theological determinism is true? Bignon mentions both biblical
grounds and philosophical grounds (229). The biblical issues aren’t discussed at great length, and when they are, I think the treatment is overly
confident (see, e.g., 176–177). The philosophical grounds all proceed from
objections to libertarianism. And, as Bignon notes elsewhere, the falsity of
libertarianism doesn’t entail theological determinism.
It’s not always clear what primary audience Bignon’s book is intended
for. The level of rigor and care in discussing distinctions and different versions of arguments often suggests its primary audience is professional
philosophers. But at other times it considers versions of arguments or
claims that one simply doesn’t—and shouldn’t—find in the philosophical
literature. Here see, for instance, the discussion of whether determinism
necessarily entails manipulation in chapter 3 or the discussion in chapter
4 of whether determinism entails mental illness. At times, Bignon’s definitions and treatment of historical issues are perplexing, especially if he intends theologians and not just philosophers to be among his audience. As
an instance here, see the claim that “all theologians who affirm libertarian
free will” are “Arminians” (10). I suspect Anselm, for instance, would be
surprised to learn that he is an Arminian. One final criticism: the press that
puts out a book such as this fails if does not require it to have an index.
Despite the limitations I’ve noted, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God
is worth reading. As Paul Helm says in the volume’s forward, this book
is “as thorough defense [of theological determinism and compatibilism]
as you’ll find” (ix). As such, it should be read both by philosophers of
religion interested in various models of divine providence and by those
philosophers interested in the compatibilism/incompatibilism debates.

Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven, edited by T.
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Paradise Understood is a collection of philosophical reflections on Heaven
that is impressively diverse both in its authorship and its subject matter.
As we learn in the introduction, eight of the seventeen essays in this volume were invited contributions by established scholars, an additional
seven essays were selected from a competition, and the remaining two
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come from the editors themselves. Twelve of the seventeen contributors
then presented versions of their papers at a conference together. As a result, quite a lot of the contributors directly address concerns or challenges
raised elsewhere in this volume, lending the work a degree of cohesiveness
not always possible in an anthology. As is often the case in a collection of
essays, the quality of the chapters is a bit uneven, but here the weaker
papers are the outliers. On the whole, this is an excellent, incisive, challenging collection of essays with material that should be of interest to just
about anyone who works in the philosophy of religion.
One note of clarification is in order with respect to the diversity of this
volume. The driving question behind this collection is not whether any
notion of paradise is philosophically defensible, but whether the Christian
conception of Heaven can withstand rigorous inquiry. This is not a criticism. An argument could be made that the concept of Heaven—as distinct
from, say, broad notions of an afterlife—is inextricably tied to the particulars of the religion in which it is posited. In this volume, for example,
most of the contributors draw from Christian scriptures, the writings of
the early Church fathers, or other foundational Christian thinkers in advancing their arguments. I offer this point of clarification only because
the introduction and first chapter are exceptions to this general rule. As a
result, a reader might get the impression that the volume applies equally
to Islamic, Judaic, or even polytheistic scholarship as it does to Christian
scholarship, and for the most part this is not the case. The questions raised
in this work are significant and far-reaching, but they are raised primarily
within the tradition of Christianity.
The seventeen essays in this volume are divided into eight parts: I. The
Basic Nature of Paradise; II. The Epistemology of Paradise; III. Virtue in
Paradise; IV. Paradise and Responding to Evil; V. The Social and Political
Philosophy of Paradise; VI. Resurrection and Paradise; VII. Freedom in
Paradise; VIII. The Desirability of Paradise. That said, there is a significant
amount of interesting overlap among the sections. One cannot do justice
to The Desirability of Paradise without also addressing The Basic Nature
of Paradise. Likewise, questions about Virtue in Paradise must be considered alongside those of Paradise and Responding to Evil and Freedom
in Paradise. In what follows, I will give a brief overview of each of the
seventeen chapters that comprise these eight parts. Out of necessity, I will
restrict my own response to the occasional comment or concern.
In chapter 1, Eric Silverman opens the volume with “Conceiving
Heaven as a Dynamic Rather than Static Existence.” He argues that
Heaven could be a place of “moral, aesthetic, epistemic, and relational
progress” (13). The details of what this progress might involve become the
focus of later chapters. Here, Silverman focuses on the advantages of a dynamic conception of Heaven, paying particular attention to the worry that
Heaven—and a static Heaven in particular—might be “boring, tedious,
and unsatisfying” (15).
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Katherin Rogers continues this discussion in chapter 2, “Anselmian
Meditations on Heaven.” In this well-crafted essay, Rogers carefully considers a number of ways in which Anselm’s philosophy might be of use
in our contemporary attempts to understand Heaven. In the process, she
raises some counterpoints to the dynamic view proposed by Silverman.
Further, she offers Anselmian insight into questions and concerns raised
by quite a lot of the chapters in this volume—concerns including, but not
limited to, human freedom, Heavenly virtue, and resurrected personal
identity.
Part II begins in chapter 3, where Ted Poston asks: “Will there be Skeptics in Heaven?” Poston’s response to this question is twofold: First, he
maintains that Cartesian knowledge is impossible for embodied creatures
and will remain impossible even in Heaven. Thus, a certain form of skepticism may be unavoidable. Second, he offers Eleonore Stump’s conception
of knowledge de te as a better way of understanding perfect embodied
knowledge. By appealing to knowledge de te—knowledge of persons,
rather than propositional knowledge—we can make sense of perfect
knowledge that is immune to the challenge of global skepticism. It is,
perhaps, worth noting here that Poston’s first move rests upon the idea
that the saints’ entry into Heaven is essentially a “change in location” (52).
Those defending the traditional view of Heaven presumably believe that
there is a great deal more to sanctification than relocation. Thus, it remains
to be shown that no aspect of sanctification could help with the skeptic’s
challenge.
In chapter 4, “The Cognitive Dimensions of Heavenly Bliss,” Jonathan
L. Kvanvig continues the discussion of what Heavenly knowledge might
be like. Drawing from the Thomistic account of the beatific vision and
from 1 Corinthians 13, Kvanvig raises and rejects the possibility that a
proper understanding of the Beatific Vision should lead us to expect infallibility or omniscience in Heaven. Like Poston, Kvanvig suggests that our
understanding of perfect heavenly knowledge might best be construed as
knowledge de te. Kvanvig, however, pushes back against the notion that de
te knowledge ought to be construed as fundamentally nonpropositional.
“Instead, what we should note is that there is no substitute for the experience itself, and so no form of communication can take the place of the
experience or awareness when the attitude in question goes beyond the
de dicto” (76).
Part III, “Virtues in Paradise,” is a set of responses to the question—
here raised by Cicero—as to whether there could be virtues in Heaven:
“For we could not need courage, when we were faced with no toil or danger; . . . nor temperance, to control lusts that would not exist” (81). In
chapter 5, “The Virtues in Heaven,” Rachel Lu considers two overlapping
but importantly different responses to this challenge, those of Aquinas
and Bonaventure. In explicating these two accounts, Lu notes the different implications that each account has for one’s conception of Heaven—in
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particular, to borrow the language of chapter 1, whether Heavenly existence will be static or dynamic.
In chapter 6, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe give explicit endorsement
to, and defense of, a dynamic conception of Heaven. More specifically,
Pawl and Timpe articulate and defend the claim that “in Heaven, the redeemed can grow in virtue” (97). This essay is rigorous and compelling,
and it has clear ties to the questions raised in Parts I, IV, VII, and VIII. If
Pawl and Timpe are correct that the kind of growth they describe could
suffice for morally relevant freedom, then this account could serve prove
quite fruitful.
Part IV, “Paradise and Responding to Evil,” begins in chapter 7 with
Adam C. Pelser’s “Heavenly Sadness: On the Value of Negative Emotions
in Paradise.” Here, Pelser explicates an interesting and rhetorically useful
distinction between “morally negative” and “affectively negative” emotions. The former, “emotions such as envy, schadenfreude, and vicious
anger,” are emotions that are themselves morally bad (119). The latter,
however, might feel bad to the subject, but that is largely because they alert
the experiencer to “legitimate badness in the world” (119). These include
emotions such as compassion and empathy, but also guilt, anger, sadness.
Armed with this distinction, and drawing from the works of Aquinas,
C. S. Lewis, and N. T. Wright, Pelser suggests that Heavenly joy might
be compatible with the presence of affectively negative emotions. That is,
the saints might sometimes feel sad in Heaven. This chapter is insightful,
challenging, and well-argued. Still, it is difficult to see past the tension
between Heavenly joy and the kinds of sadness posited by Pelser. He asks:
How could a mother not be saddened by the irrevocable loss of her precious
son, or a husband not be saddened by the irrevocable separation from his
beloved wife, especially in light of the knowledge that the beloved is suffering away from the presence of the good and loving God for all eternity?
(127)

The claim, of course, is that sadness in the face of such realities is morally
better than a lack of sadness. This may be true, but the question remains:
How could a mother experience any joy, let alone perfect Heavenly joy,
alongside sadness of such magnitude? Is it conceivable that a spouse
might mourn the eternal loss of his beloved and yet rejoice? In Pelser’s
defense, this tension is not of his making. Nevertheless, it remains; the
distinction between affectively negative and morally negative emotions, it
seems, only goes so far.
T. Ryan Byerly continues this discussion in chapter 8 with “Virtues of
Repair in Paradise.” Here, Byerly focuses on what he calls “a particularly
challenging category of virtues . . . virtues that equip their possessors to
respond excellently to moral wrongdoing” (136). Given the fact that “virtues of repair” aid in response to moral wrongdoing, and the fact that
there will, presumably, not be any moral wrongdoing in Heaven, they seem
at first glance ill-suited for paradise. Byerly, however, maintains that such
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virtues “might be exercised in Heaven” (137). This chapter focuses largely
on the virtue of forgivingness, but he suggests that it could be applied to
other virtues of repair as well.
Part V, “The Social and Political Philosophy of Paradise,” contains two
markedly different papers. In chapter 9, Shawn Graves, Blake Hereth, and
Tyler M. John give a series of arguments “In Defense of Animal Universalism.” This is undoubtedly a timely topic. Universalism and a rejection
of “speciesism” are positions that have gained a great deal of traction in
recent years. Unfortunately, this chapter felt significantly less substantive than the rest. In contrast, Robert Audi’s “Personhood, Embodiment
and Survival” offers no formal arguments, yet is a characteristically rich,
insightful and careful series of reflections on personal identity and the
resurrection. Audi concludes, “For those who take survival seriously . . .
rational hope seems both possible and a potentially sustaining stance in a
world where the bad often seems so increasingly threatening to the good”
(209). The content of this chapter is directly relevant to questions raised in
Parts I, VI, and VIII.
Part VI, “Resurrection and Paradise,” includes three very different responses to the “Problem of Personal Identity beyond Death,” or “PPID”
(as per Brown). It begins with chapter 11, “Composition and the Will of
God: Reconsidering Resurrection by Reassembly” by Eric T. Yang and
Stephen T. Davis. Here, Yang and Davis articulate and defend a view of
“resurrection by reassembly” (213). In doing so, they adopt “a version of
restricted composition,” whereby some composite objects can be said to
exist (219). The defining feature of this account is the particular ontological
glue that holds their composite objects together—namely, the will of God.
In response to the “Special Composition Question,” Yang and Davis maintain that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of a composite object
is that God will it to be so. Thus, at the resurrection, God must reassemble
(all or most of) the parts that made up your original body, and then will
that it be you. This paper is quite interesting, and has some epistemological consequences that are undoubtedly difficult to accept. Nevertheless,
as Yang and Davis note, there are no simple and unproblematic accounts
of personal identity beyond death. Their modest conclusion is that their
account “should be considered as a competitor to the simulacrum, falling
elevator, and anti-criterialist accounts. Or at least it should be regarded as
no more puzzling and worrisome than these views” (225).
In chapter 12, Christopher Brown articulates and motivates PPID, considers four contemporary responses—compound substance dualism, resurrection by reassembly, Van Inwagen’s “Naked Kernel,” and Corcoran’s
“Fission”—and, finally, offers Thomistic dualism as a preferable solution
to the problem. In contrast to both Cartesian and compound substance
dualism, Brown notes, on Thomistic dualism “the soul is not—never is—a
substance” (254). Further, the Thomistic soul “is not—never is—identical to a human person” (256). Instead, it is “a metaphysical part of the
person that is sufficient to preserve the existence, numerical identity, and
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characteristic activity of that human person whose part it is during the
interim state [between death and resurrection]” (256). In this way, Brown
argues, Thomistic dualism offers a response to PPID “which shares the
advantages of each of the contemporary views we’ve taken a look at, but
without their disadvantages” (256). That something could exist in such
a way as to preserve the existence of a human person and yet fail to be a
substance is, to this reader at least, a difficult claim to process. Still, Brown
offers a genuinely new response to an old challenge, and this paper is well
worth a careful read.
Part VI concludes with Hud Hudson’s contribution, “The Resurrection
and Hypertime.” Here, as in an earlier work (Hudson, The Fall and Hypertime [Oxford University Press, 2013]), Hudson suggests “The Hyptertime
Solution” to the question that, he notes, could be raised by a five-year-old:
“So, just where are heaven and hell?” (263). Very briefly stated, Hudson’s
answer is this: in the hyperfuture! “Thus, the Hyptertime Hypothesis,
at first approximation, is something like a second temporal dimension”
(268). This is a paper that resists summarization and really ought to be
read in its entirety. In addition to offering a new way of making sense of
the resurrection, Hudson notes that this solution has implications for the
problem of evil as well, and perhaps even supports the potential compatibility of the existence of a (non-empty) Hell and universal salvation (269).
Part VII, “Freedom in Paradise,” asks whether the preferred solution
to the problem of evil, the free will defense, might threaten traditional
conceptions of Heaven. More succinctly, these chapters ask the following:
If morally responsible freedom is so valuable, ought we not to have it in
Heaven? In chapter 14, “Resting on Your Laurels,” Brian Boeninger and
Robert K. Garcia formulate an aporia intended to demonstrate that “the
commitments of Heaven and the Defense lead to a contradiction. Thus, it
seems that Heaven and the Defense are incompatible” (282). This is a remarkable conclusion, and it is supported by a well-crafted essay. Indeed,
the challenge raised here—in particular, the rejection of moral responsibility “tracing”—is explicitly addressed elsewhere in this volume and seems
likely to generate further discussion (see Rogers [chap. 2] and Pawl and
Timpe [chap. 6]).
In chapter 15, “The Possibility and Scope of Significant Heavenly Freedom,” Richard Tamburro pushes back against the claim that the Heavenly
goods of freedom would require the possibility of sin. Instead, Tamburro
writes: “I suggest that we abandon the idea that significant freedom has
to do with moral significance” (319). In explicating his account, Tamburro
asks how we might understand the beatific vision such that persons in
Heaven could be both free and incapable of sin. He appeals to the infinite
nature of God, the infinite nature of eternity, and the finite nature of our
own minds to note that, in Heaven, finite creatures might face unlimited
opportunities for good choices. In this chapter, Tamburro specifically addresses the challenge raised in chapter 1 of this volume—that Heaven
might be boring—and he offers a response to Pawl and Timpe’s claim that
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Heavenly freedom ought best to be construed as “growing in virtue” (319).
Although he does not explicitly address Boeninger and Garcia’s aporia,
the application of Tamburro’s argument to their challenge is self-evident.
On the whole, this chapter is quite strong, with implications for a host of
philosophical questions.
The final part of this anthology is VIII, “The Desirability of Paradise.”
Here we find two quite different essays. In chapter 16, Jerry L. Walls considers the challenge raised by the life and death of Hume. Walls writes, “In
short, the case of Hume suggests that we do not need God either to live
a good life or to die a good death. It proposes that a man can be virtuous
and he can die in peace, even cheerfully, with no prospect of immortality
or any hope for goods beyond this life. Perhaps most unsettling is Hume’s
utter lack of interest in immortality” (332). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Walls
goes on to argue that this conclusion is false; God is necessary both for a
good life and a good death.
In chapter 17, Richard Swinburne concludes the volume with “Why the
Life of Heaven is Supremely Worth Living.” Swinburne’s goal is straightforward. He writes “I shall develop widely held intuitions about what
makes a life a good life to live, and so what would make a life the best sort
of life to live forever; and I shall then argue that the kind of after-life to be
enjoyed by the Blessed as described in patristic thought, is just that sort of
life” (350). This chapter includes some previously published material, but
it nevertheless stands out as a highlight of this anthology. In response to
the “boredom” problem, he notes: “Most earthly occupations indeed pall
after a time, but the reason why they pall is that there are no new facets
to them which are greatly worthwhile having. A person who desires only
the good and its continuation would not, given the Christian doctrine of
God, be bored in eternity” (356). Here and elsewhere, Swinburne brings
both simplicity and seriousness to many of the challenges raised in this
volume. This chapter is a fitting and worthy conclusion to this excellent
anthology.

